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I. INTRODUCTION 
In modern times, low-cost technology has made it relatively easy 
for telemarketing companies to solicit consumers.2  The increasingly 
widespread use of telemarketing in recent years has led to the enact-
ment of numerous laws aimed at curbing telemarketers’ practices.3  
Recently, Congress has expressed concern over the current state of 
the law with respect to unsolicited commercial advertisements that 
are sent to fax machines, otherwise known as “junk faxes.”4  Since 
1991, this area of law has evolved dramatically as Congress has sought 
to achieve a proper balance between the property interests and pri-
vacy concerns of junk fax recipients and the advertising interests of 
junk fax senders.5  The difficulty lies in maximizing the efficiency of 
potential regulations in this area, while decreasing the burden im-
posed on the interests of the parties involved. 
 1 Pub. L. No. 109-21, 119 Stat. 359 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227). 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2007, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S.B.A. in Finance, 
2003, University of Delaware. 
 2 Jennifer L. Radner, Comment, Phone, Fax, and Frustration: Electronic Commercial 
Speech and Nuisance Law, 42 EMORY L.J. 359, 376 (1993) (“In recent years, possibly due 
to the growing intrusiveness of new communications technology, it seems that regu-
lating communications media has grown in popularity.”). 
 3 See Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005; Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited 
Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701–13 (Supp. IV 2004)); Telephone Consumer Protection Act 
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227 
(2000 & Supp. III 2003)). 
 4 The receipt of a junk fax is very similar to the receipt of spam e-mail, only 
transmitted through a fax machine. 
 5 See Telephone Consumer Protection Act § 2(9) (reporting congressional find-
ings); see also 137 CONG. REC. H11307, 11310–11315 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (dis-
cussing improvements in the law that would help to achieve the appropriate balance 
in this area). 
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Congress has attempted to achieve the appropriate balance with 
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) of 19916 and 
through subsequent modifications set forth in the Junk Fax Preven-
tion Act (JFPA) of 2005.7  However, the strict language of the TCPA 
required a sender to obtain “prior express invitation or permission” 
before any unsolicited advertising,8 inappropriately tipping the bal-
ance in favor of the junk fax recipient while inadequately addressing 
the sender’s marketing concerns.9  Although the JFPA was intended 
to improve upon the TCPA’s regulations by alleviating a portion of 
the junk fax sender’s burden,10 the JFPA’s new “established business 
relationship” (EBR) 11 and “opt-out clause”12 provisions fail to ade-
quately protect the interests of those who are forced to bear the bur-
den of unwanted faxes. 
This Comment will focus on the regulatory efforts that have 
been imposed concerning junk faxes, the evolution of the various 
regulations in this area, and the possibility of establishing more effi-
cient and balanced controls.  Part II of this Comment will discuss the 
history of the TCPA, how the TCPA and its regulations came to frui-
tion, and the importance of the various provisions dealing with junk 
faxes.  Next, Part III will analyze the courts’ interpretation of the 
TCPA, mainly with respect to unsolicited faxes and telemarketing.  
Part III will briefly discuss how courts have interpreted the TCPA and 
its ban on unsolicited junk faxes in light of criticisms that it violates a 
person’s First Amendment right to commercial speech.13  Part IV will 
address the recent changes set forth in the JFPA and the balance that 
the JFPA attempts to achieve with respect to junk faxes.  In addition, 
Part IV.A will examine the ability of the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) under the JFPA to interpret and affect the dy-
namic landscape of junk fax law.  Furthermore, Part IV.B will discuss 
the practical effects of the JFPA, along with the protections and ex-
ceptions provided by the JFPA.  Finally, Part V will propose, and ar-
gue for, more balanced junk fax law regulations in order to tailor and 
 6 Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227 
(2000 & Supp. III 2003)). 
 7 Pub. L. No. 109-21,119 Stat. 359 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227). 
 8 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (2000 & Supp. 2003).  The JFPA eliminated this pro-
vision.  See infra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 9 151 CONG. REC. H5262, 5265 (daily ed. Jun. 28, 2005) (statement of Rep. 
Markey). 
 10 Id. 
 11 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 227(b)(1)(C)(i)–(ii) (West 2001 & Supp. 2006). 
 12 Id. § 227(b)(2)(D). 
 13 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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improve upon the current provisions in the JFPA.  The proposals in-
clude a variety of different approaches designed to achieve Congress’ 
ultimate objective.14  The most notable approaches are (1) an opt-in 
approach for potential junk fax receivers and (2) more flexibility for 
the FCC to specify when an “established business relationship”15 is 
created.  These recommendations are intended to balance both the 
privacy and property concerns of junk fax recipients, while easing the 
burden imposed on junk fax senders and facilitating their marketing 
interests. 
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE REGULATION OF UNSOLICITED 
COMMERCIAL ADVERTISING AND THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT OF 199116
The recent technological advances available to marketers have 
helped to create a much more powerful and efficient telemarketing 
industry.  Unfortunately, these advances have placed a substantial 
burden on potential consumers and their privacy interests.17  These 
consumers have expressed concern over the lack of regulations im-
posed on the telemarketing industry, and many Americans have in-
sisted that action be taken in order to relieve them from unwanted, 
irritable, and costly solicitations.18  Most importantly, more stringent 
regulations were needed to control “automatic dialers, junk faxes, 
and unwanted telephone solicitations.”19
In 1991, Congress responded to consumers’ widespread criti-
cisms by adding the TCPA to Title II of the Communications Act of 
1934.20  The primary purpose of the TCPA was “to prohibit certain 
 14 See infra notes 21–23 and accompanying text. 
 15 47 U.S.C. §§ 227(b)(1)(C)(i)–(ii). 
 16 Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 
2394 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2000 & Supp. III 2003)). 
 17 137 CONG. REC. H11307, 11310 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Rep. 
Markey) (“[T]he aim of [the TCPA] is not to eliminate the brave new world of tele-
marketing, but rather to secure an individual’s right to privacy that might be unin-
tentionally intruded upon by these new technologies.”); see also Radner, supra note 2, 
at 377 (noting that although the use of technology to facilitate unsolicited commer-
cial advertising has become quite a profitable industry, telephone and facsimile so-
licitation is a burden on the recipients of this advertising and has grown exponen-
tially with recent technological advances). 
 18 Adam Zitter, Note, Good Laws for Junk Fax? Government Regulation of Unsolicited 
Solicitations, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2767, 2822 (2004). 
 19 137 CONG. REC. H11307, 11311 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Rep. 
Rinaldo). 
 20 Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394.  The TCPA amended Title II of the Com-
munications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–231 (2000). 
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practices involving the use of telephone equipment”21 by placing “re-
strictions on unsolicited, automated telephone calls to the home and 
by restricting certain uses of fax machines and automatic dialers.”22  
Congress felt that “[i]ndividuals’ privacy rights, public safety interests, 
and commercial freedoms of speech and trade [should] be balanced 
in a way that protects the privacy of individuals and permits legitimate 
telemarketing practices.”23  The TCPA was “the first significant step in 
curbing what many perceived as an onslaught of telemarketing that 
had invaded American homes.”24  The regulations adopted by the 
TCPA attempted to control the burden imposed by a completely un-
restricted telemarketing industry, while balancing the technological 
advances in telemarketing with the right to privacy that individuals 
are entitled to maintain in their homes.25
The TCPA makes it unlawful for a person “to make any call . . . 
using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial prere-
corded voice” to a service where the receiving party would be charged 
for the call.26  Also, the TCPA prohibits anyone from initiating a call 
to a “residential telephone line using an artificial or prerecorded 
 21 See 47 U.S.C. § 227. 
 22 Edwin L. Klett & Rochelle L. Brightwell, Telemarketing: Exercise in Free Speech or 
Just a Pain in the Neck?, 24 PA. LAWYER 38, 39 (2002).  The telemarketing industry has 
evolved into a booming business due to “the increased use of cost-effective telemar-
keting techniques.” Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
243, §§ 2(1), (4), 105 Stat. 2394, 2394 (reporting congressional findings). 
 23 § 2(9), 105 Stat. 2394, 2394(reporting congressional findings). 
 24 Hillary B. Miller and Robert R. Biggerstaff, Application of the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act to Intrastate Telemarketing Calls and Faxes, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 667, 668 
(2000). 
 25 Howard E. Berkenblit, Note, Can Those Telemarketing Machines Keep Calling 
Me?—The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 After Moser v. FCC, 36 B.C. L. REV. 
85, 96 (1994).  More specifically, Congress found that “[o]ver 30,000 businesses ac-
tively telemarket goods and services to business and residential customers.”  § 2(2), 
105 Stat. 2394, 2394 (reporting congressional findings); see also id.  § 2(5), 105 Stat. 
2394, 2394 (“Unrestricted telemarketing, however,  can be an intrusive invasion of 
privacy and, when an emergency telephone line is seized, a risk to public safety.”); id. 
§ 2(8), 105 Stat. 2394, 2394 (“The constitution does not prohibit restrictions on com-
mercial telemarketing solicitations.”); id. § 2(11), 105 Stat. 2394, 2394 (“Technolo-
gies that might allow consumers to avoid receiving such calls are not universally 
available, are costly, are unlikely to be enforced, or place an inordinate burden on 
the consumer.”). 
 26 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2000 & Supp. III 2003).  Although every call for 
which the receiving party would be charged is banned, certain calls are specifically 
mentioned by this section, such as those to a cell phone or paging service.  Id.  How-
ever, there is an exception if the call was made for emergency purposes or if it was 
made with the “prior express consent” of the party receiving the call.  Id. § 
227(b)(1)(A). 
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voice . . . without the prior express consent of the called party.”27  Al-
though the TCPA did not specifically address “live” unsolicited tele-
phone calls, the TCPA enabled the FCC to establish a national do-
not-call database for those who do not wish to receive such telephone 
solicitations.28
In addition, one of the primary goals of the TCPA was to pro-
hibit unsolicited commercial advertisements sent to fax machines, 
known as “junk faxes.”29  As the use of fax machines continued to 
grow, junk mail’s electronic equivalent, the “junk fax,” had also be-
come prevalent.30  Although junk fax advertising is similar to tele-
marketing calls in that it invades an individual’s privacy interest,31 it 
imposes additional burdens on the recipients as well.  One of the 
burdens that concerned Congress was the shifting of the sender’s 
costs to the recipient, who is inappropriately forced to bear the ex-
penses associated with the receipt of the fax.32  Representative Ed-
ward Markey of Massachusetts, quoting an article from the Washington 
Post, stated that “receiving junk fax is like getting junk mail with the 
postage due.”33  In a 2003 case,34 the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit suggested that a junk fax recipient bore more 
than $100 a year in direct costs “which came in the form of paper, 
toner, time required to recognize and discard unwanted faxes, and 
the temporary inability to send and receive faxes.”35
Moreover, junk faxes can inconvenience recipients for various 
reasons.  The marketer’s ability to send out numerous unsolicited fax 
advertisements could extend to all hours of the day, and a recipient’s 
 27 Id. § 227(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added).  There is also an exception here if the 
call was made for emergency purposes or if the call “is exempted by rule or order by 
the Commission under paragraph (2)(B).”  Id. 
 28 Id. § 227(c)(3).  Though the power to create this national do-not-call registry 
was granted to the FCC, the registry was not put into effect until October 1, 2003.  .In 
re Rules and Regulations Implementing Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 18 F.C.C.R. 
14,014, 14,034 (2003). 
 29 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 
 30 136 CONG. REC. H5818, 5820 (daily ed. July 30, 1990) (statement of Rep. 
Markey). 
 31 137 CONG. REC. S16204, 16208 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1991) (statement of Sen. 
Bentsen). 
 32 136 CONG. REC. H5818, 5820 (daily ed. July 30, 1990) (statement of Rep. 
Markey). 
 33 Id. (quoting Jerry Knight, The Junk Fax Attack:  Why Maryland May Outlaw Unso-
licited Advertisements, WASH. POST, May 23, 1989, at C3). 
 34 Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 35 Zitter, supra note 18, at 2807 (citing Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d at 655); see also 
Destination Ventures v. FCC, 46 F.3d 54, 56–57 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing the sig-
nificant costs borne by a junk fax recipient). 
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phone line(s) could be tied up for a substantial period of time, effec-
tively preventing the recipient from receiving any other faxes.36  In 
addition, the recipient is forced to sort through and decipher be-
tween important faxes and those which can be discarded.37  Unfortu-
nately for these recipients, junk fax advertising is an extremely attrac-
tive marketing option for advertisers because of its cost-efficiencies.38  
For instance, the sender of the fax generally incurs only the cost of 
making a simple telephone call.39
To alleviate these problems, the TCPA set out to create a com-
plete ban on unsolicited commercial faxes, making it “unlawful for 
any person within the United States . . . to use any telephone facsim-
ile machine, computer, or other device to send an unsolicited adver-
tisement to a telephone facsimile machine.”40  Furthermore, Con-
gress defined the term “unsolicited advertisement”41 in the TCPA as 
“any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any 
property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person with-
out that person’s prior express invitation or permission.”42  These 
provisions in the original TCPA were very protective of the junk fax 
recipient because they required his or her “express invitation or per-
mission” before enabling a sender to transmit an unsolicited adver-
tisement via fax.43  Congress was careful to select this requirement of 
“express invitation or permission” in the TCPA over a potential alter-
native method that would require recipients to “opt-out” of any unso-
licited faxes that they did not wish to receive: 
 36 136 CONG. REC. H5818, 5820 (daily ed. July 30, 1990) (statement of Rep. 
Ritter). 
 37 David E. Sorkin, Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail and the Telephone Consumer Protec-
tion Act of 1991, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 1001, 1011 (1997). 
 38 Michael A. Fisher, Note, The Right to Spam? Regulating Electronic Junk Mail, 23 
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 363, 380 (2000) (“The involuntary shifting of costs onto fax 
recipients prompted Congress to include 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) as part of the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991.”). 
 39 Sorkin, supra note 37, at 1008. 
 40 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (2000 & Supp. III 2003).  Congress subsequently 
amended this section of the TCPA with the new provisions included in the JFPA.  47 
U.S.C.A. §§ 227(b)(1)(C)(i)–(iii) (West 2001 & Supp. 2006). 
 41 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4). 
 42 Id.  This was the section in the original TCPA, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 
2394 (1991) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2000 & Supp. 2003)).  Since 
the enactment of the JFPA, the definition has been modified.  Under the new defini-
tion, the term “unsolicited advertisement” means “any material advertising the com-
mercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted 
to any person without that person’s prior express invitation or permission, in writing 
or otherwise.”  47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(5) (2000 & Supp. III 2003) (emphasis added). 
 43 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 
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The legislative history indicates that one of Congress’ primary 
concerns was to protect the public from bearing the costs of un-
wanted advertising. Certain practices were treated differently be-
cause they impose costs on consumers.  For example, under the 
TCPA, calls to wireless phones and numbers for which the called 
party is charged are prohibited in the absence of an emergency or 
without the prior express consent of the called party.  Because of 
the cost shifting involved with fax advertising, Congress similarly 
prohibited unsolicited faxes without the prior express permission 
of the recipient.  Unlike the do-not-call list for telemarketing calls, 
Congress provided no mechanism for opting out of unwanted fac-
simile advertisements. Such an opt-out list would require the re-
cipient to possibly bear the cost of the initial facsimile and inap-
propriately place the burden on the recipient to contact the 
sender and request inclusion on a “do-not-fax” list.44
Therefore, when the TCPA went into effect on December 20, 1992,45 
the statute more than adequately addressed the concerns expressed 
by junk fax recipients, allowing them to sue the sender of an unsolic-
ited junk fax if the fax was sent without their “prior express invitation 
or permission.”46
III.     CHALLENGES TO THE TCPA AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 
Telemarketers have frequently argued that the TCPA unlawfully 
restricts their right to commercial speech,47 which has traditionally 
been protected under the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.48  In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Commission of New York,49 the Supreme Court of the United States ar-
ticulated a four-pronged test in order to determine whether commer-
cial speech has been properly restricted.50  The Court held that a 
regulation on commercial speech is permissible if: (1) the First 
 44 In re Rules and Regulations Implementing Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 18 
F.C.C.R. 14,014, 14,128 (2003) (footnotes omitted). 
 45 Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 (1991) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 
227). 
 46 47 U.S.C. §§ 227(a)(4), (b)(3).  Although this may have been the intended ef-
fect of the original TCPA, the FCC interpreted these provisions differently.  See infra 
note 89 and accompanying text. 
 47 See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649, 652 (8th Cir. 
2003); Destination Ventures v. FCC, 46 F.3d 54, 55 (9th Cir. 1995); Kenro, Inc. v. Fax 
Daily, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1162, 1167 (S.D. Ind. 1997). 
 48 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom 
of speech, or of the press . . . .”). 
 49 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 50 Id. at 566. 
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Amendment protects the speech;51 (2) a substantial governmental in-
terest is asserted; (3) the regulation directly advances this asserted in-
terest; and (4) the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve that inter-
est.52
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has determined that commer-
cial speech is entitled to substantial constitutional protection, al-
though it should be afforded less protection than other forms of ex-
pression.53  The Court also found that there must be a “reasonable 
fit” between the interest sought and the governmental regulations, 
but the regulations do not have to be the “least restrictive” means to 
achieve their desired interest.54  Considering the Supreme Court’s in-
terpretations, the TCPA has consistently withstood scrutiny in the 
federal courts under the Central Hudson test for First Amendment re-
strictions on commercial speech.55
In Destination Ventures v. FCC,56 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit determined that the TCPA’s ban on unso-
licited advertisements was justified because Congress’ intended goal 
was to prevent cost-shifting in advertising.57  The circuit court held 
that the TCPA’s ban on unsolicited fax advertising was narrowly tai-
lored to meet the government’s interest.58  Similarly, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit59 concluded that the 
TCPA’s restrictions were proportionate and narrowly tailored to the 
government’s interests because there were other forms of advertising 
still available to advertisers.60  The court noted that unsolicited fax 
advertising caused significant interference and cost-shifting onto the 
recipients.61  Despite these frequent challenges to the TCPA’s consti-
 51 To satisfy this provision, according to the Court, commercial speech must not 
be misleading and must concern lawful activity.  Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64–68 (1983); see also Bd. of 
Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (“‘[C]ommercial speech [enjoys] a limited 
measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of 
First Amendment values,’ and is subject to ‘modes of regulation that might be im-
permissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.’” (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio 
State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (alteration in original))). 
 54 Fox, 492 U.S. at 477–80. 
 55 See infra notes 56–62 and accompanying text. 
 56 46 F.3d 54 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 57 Id. at 56. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 60 Id. at 659. 
 61 Id. 
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tutionality,62 the provisions of the TCPA regarding junk faxes had 
remained good law at the time of the JFPA’s revisions.63  Conse-
quently, the prevalence of marketing through the use of junk faxes 
had experienced a dramatic decline.64
IV.     THE JUNK FAX PREVENTION ACT OF 2005—THE MOST RECENT 
ADDITION TO THE TCPA 
On July 9, 2005, President Bush signed the Junk Fax Prevention 
Act65 into law.66  The JFPA amended the TCPA by adding a few major 
provisions.67  While the effects of these new provisions remain to be 
seen, they have the potential to dramatically alter the existing land-
scape of junk faxing.  First, the JFPA eliminates the “prior express 
permission” provision set forth in the original TCPA.68  The JFPA now 
enables junk faxes to be sent so long as there is an “established busi-
ness relationship” (“EBR”)69 between the sender and the receiver of 
the fax.70  An EBR is currently defined by the JFPA as: 
[A] prior or existing relationship formed by a voluntary two-way 
communication between a person or entity and a residential sub-
scriber with or without an exchange of consideration, on the basis 
of the subscriber’s purchase or transaction with the entity within 
the eighteen (18) months immediately preceding the date of the 
telephone call or on the basis of the subscriber’s inquiry or appli-
 62 See, e.g., Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1162 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (hold-
ing that the ban on junk faxes directly relates to the government’s interest in protect-
ing consumers from intrusion on their fax machines and from advertiser’s cost shift-
ing and that the ban is narrowly tailored).  The Kenro court added that faxes were 
different from junk mail, newspaper ads, and television because of the costs and po-
tential interference with legitimate business activity that faxes impose on unwilling 
consumers.  Id. at 1168. 
 63 Zitter, supra note 18, at 2774. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Pub. L. No. 109-21, 119 Stat. 359 (2005) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2000 & 
Supp. 2006)). 
 66 Press Release, The White House, President Signs Junk Fax Prevention Act of 
2005 (July 11, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 
2005/07/20050711.html. 
 67 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(a)(2) (West 2001 & Supp. 2006) (defining an EBR 
for purposes of the JFPA); id. §§ 227(b)(1)(C)(i)–(iii) (establishing exceptions to 
the general ban on junk faxes without “prior express permission”); id. §§ 
227(b)(2)(D)–(G) (further enhancing the FCC’s power to implement the require-
ments of the JFPA). 
 68 Id. § 227(b)(1)(C).  The JFPA added subsections (b)(1)(C)(i)–(iii) which pro-
vided new exceptions, such as the EBR, to the “prior express permission” require-
ment that did not previously exist under the TCPA. 
 69 Id. § 227(b)(1)(C)(i). 
 70 Id. 
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cation regarding products or services offered by the entity within 
the three months immediately preceding the date of the call, 
which relationship has not been previously terminated by either 
party.71
However, the JFPA subjects the duration of an EBR’s existence to any 
time limitations that the FCC determines appropriate.72
Furthermore, the JFPA enables a junk faxer to send these unso-
licited faxes if the sender obtained the recipient’s fax number 
through “a directory, advertisement, or site on the Internet to which 
the recipient voluntarily agreed to make available its facsimile num-
ber for public distribution.”73  This provision significantly broadens 
the ability of senders to create an EBR with potential recipients, ena-
bling the senders to freely and legally transmit a greater amount of 
junk faxes.  Although Congress gave the FCC some flexibility in limit-
ing the duration of an existing EBR,74 it did not provide the FCC with 
any power to limit the relative ease of this initial EBR creation. 
The JFPA does attempt to grant additional protections to help 
curb the potential prevalence of junk faxes due to the EBR.  Junk fax 
senders are required to include notice of an opt-out opportunity for 
the receivers of their unsolicited advertisements.75  This notice to opt-
out must be contained on the first page of every junk fax in order for 
the receiver to determine whether he or she wishes to stop receiving 
the unsolicited advertisements.76  The notice must also explicitly state 
that the recipient can request that the sender not send any future 
junk faxes.77  Failure to comply with a proper request not to receive 
 71 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(4) (2003).  The JFPA does not specifically define an 
EBR.  See 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(a)(2).  Instead, the JFPA refers to the definition of the 
term as set forth by the Code of Federal Regulations, which went into effect on January 
1, 2003.  Id.  However, the JFPA does provide two slight alterations for purposes of 
the Act.  Id. §§ 227(a)(2)(A)–(B).  First, an EBR “shall include a relationship be-
tween a person or entity and a business subscriber subject to the same terms applica-
ble under such section to a relationship between a person or entity and a residential 
subscriber . . . .”  Id. § 227(a)(2)(A).  Second, the JFPA limits the duration of the 
EBR to a period that the FCC mandates.  Id. § 227(a)(2)(B). 
 72 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(b)(2)(G)(i).  Before the FCC can exercise this right, it must 
evaluate certain factors set forth by the JFPA and cannot commence a proceeding to 
determine whether the duration of an EBR’s existence should be limited until three 
months after the JFPA is enacted (the JFPA was enacted on July 9, 2005).  Id. §§ 
227(b)(2)(G)(i)–(ii). 
 73 Id. § 227(b)(1)(C)(ii)(II).  When discussing this specific provision in this Com-
ment, it will be classified as though it is part of the EBR exception of the JFPA. 
 74 Id. § 227(b)(2)(G). 
 75 Id. § 227(b)(2)(D). 
 76 Id. § 227(b)(2)(D)(i). 
 77 Id. § 227(b)(2)(D)(ii). 
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any further junk faxes “within the shortest reasonable time, as deter-
mined by the Commission,” is unlawful.78  Moreover, the junk fax 
sender must provide a recipient with a cost-free means of transmit-
ting a request to opt-out and an opportunity to make such a request 
“at any time on any day of the week.”79
When compared with the junk fax regulations in the TCPA,80 the 
JFPA’s recently added provisions allow significantly more flexibility 
for the junk fax sender to market through fax machines.81  However, 
the changes to the TCPA could have been expected considering the 
inordinate amount of restraints imposed by the TCPA on junk fax 
senders and its practical application with respect to junk faxing.82  
Congress recognized that a change was needed since legitimate fax 
communications had become substantially burdened by the then cur-
rent law.83
Not only could the JFPA have been anticipated, but many busi-
nesses consider the new provisions to be a dramatic improvement in 
the junk fax field.84  As a practical matter, the FCC interpreted the 
TCPA’s provision requiring “prior express invitation or permission” 
to send junk faxes much more broadly than what Congress seemingly 
intended pursuant to the plain language of the statute.85  The FCC’s 
Rules and Regulations implementing the TCPA stated that “facsimile 
transmission[s] from persons or entities who have an established 
business relationship with the recipient can be deemed to be invited 
or permitted by the recipient.”86  This finding effectively continued to 
allow junk faxes, minimizing the original intended effectiveness of 
the TCPA.  The FCC’s interpretation that junk faxes were permissible 
as long as there was an “established business relationship” had con-
 78 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(b)(2)(D)(ii). 
 79 Id. §§ 227(b)(2)(D)(iv)(II), (v). 
 80 See supra notes 40–46 and accompanying text. 
 81 151 CONG. REC. H5262, 5264–65 (daily ed. Jun. 28, 2005) (statement of Rep. 
Markey). 
 82 The FCC interpreted the TCPA’s provisions on junk faxes to allow for an estab-
lished business relationship exception, even though the language of the TCPA made 
no mention of an EBR.  See infra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 83 151 CONG. REC. H5262, 5264 (daily ed. Jun. 28, 2005) (statement of Rep. Up-
ton). 
 84 See, e.g., Junk Fax Bill, Hearing on S. 714 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and 
Transp., 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Hearing] (testimony of  Jon. E. Bladine, Re-
gion 9 Director, National Newspaper Association), available at 
http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/bladine.pdf. 
 85 151 CONG. REC. H5262, 5264–65 (daily ed. Jun. 28, 2005) (statement of Rep. 
Markey). 
 86 In re Rules and Regulations Implementing Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 7 
F.C.C.R. 8752, 8779 n.87 (1992). 
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fused courts, since this language was not explicitly stated in the TCPA 
itself.87  In 2003, the FCC acknowledged that this interpretation con-
flicted with the original intentions of the TCPA88 and planned on al-
leviating the problem: 
Since 1992, the FCC has interpreted the general ban in the 
[TCPA] on facsimile transmissions of advertising messages to in-
clude an “established business relationship exception,” which al-
lows businesses to send advertising faxes to customers. But the ex-
ception is not actually written into the statute, and the agency 
intend[ed] to revise its interpretation as of January 1, 2005.89
The FCC sought this revision to ensure that the EBR exception would 
no longer be implied and to re-establish the original intention of the 
TCPA, which was to require “prior express invitation or permission” 
before sending an unsolicited commercial fax.90  The FCC noted that 
the TCPA’s interpretation failed to adequately consider the interests 
of the junk fax recipient: 
We now reverse our prior conclusion that an established business 
relationship provides companies with the necessary express per-
mission to send faxes to their customers . . . . [T]he EBR will no 
longer be sufficient to show that an individual or business has 
given their express permission to receive unsolicited facsimile ad-
vertisements.  The record in this proceeding reveals consumers 
and businesses receive faxes they believe they have neither solic-
ited nor given their permission to receive. Recipients of these 
faxed advertisements assume the cost of the paper used, the cost 
associated with the use of the facsimile machine, and the costs as-
sociated with the time spent receiving a facsimile advertisement 
during which the machine cannot be used by its owner to send or 
receive other facsimile transmissions.91
After considering the interference and cost-shifting involved in re-
ceiving an unwanted fax, the FCC reallocated the balance of priori-
 87 See Chair King, Inc. v. GTE Mobilnet of Houston, Inc., 135 S.W.3d 365, 394 
(Tex. App. 2004) (“This notion of deeming permission is based on an inference and, 
as such, seems to conflict with the TCPA’s requirement that the invitation or permis-
sion be express . . . .  Characterizing permission granted by implication as ‘express’ 
runs afoul of the plain meaning of the word.”). 
 88 In re Rules and Regulations Implementing Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991,, 
18 F.C.C.R. 14,014, 14,127–28 (2003). 
 89 Richard E. Wiley & Rosemary C. Harold, Contentious Times in a Shifting Land-
scape, in COMMUNICATIONS LAW 2004 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Liter-
ary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 2981, 2004), available at 811 PLI/PAT 109, 
244 (November 2004). 
 90 151 CONG. REC. S3280, 3280 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 2005) (statement of Sen. Smith). 
 91 In re Rules and Regulations Implementing Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991,, 
18 F.C.C.R. 14,014, 14,127–28 (2003) (footnote omitted). 
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ties in order to favor junk fax recipients, noting that their interests far 
outweighed those of the senders who wished to advertise.92
The “prior express invitation or permission” provision in the 
TCPA, however, imposed an extraordinary burden on businesses that 
relied on junk fax advertising.93  These businesses strongly advocated 
for some type of exemption, because they did not want to face the 
problem of obtaining customers’ prior written consent before send-
ing each and every unsolicited fax.94  For example, a broad EBR ex-
emption is beneficial to the real estate industry because unsolicited 
advertising is commonly used to communicate in the normal course 
of business to respond to potential home-owner inquires.95  Faxes are 
used so frequently in this industry to communicate with clients be-
cause of their speed and cost effectiveness.96  These types of concerns 
ultimately led to the adoption of the broad EBR exemption97 in the 
JFPA,98 which seems to have provided the flexibility necessary to re-
lieve businesses of this onerous burden.99  However, Congress rea-
soned that the intention of the JFPA was not to legalize junk faxes 
but, rather, to provide an exception to the complete ban while offer-
ing junk fax recipients additional protection in the form of an opt-
out clause.100
A. The Power of the FCC under the JFPA 
Currently, it is difficult to gauge how the JFPA will affect the fu-
ture of junk faxing, and only time will tell how the new provisions will 
be implemented and enforced.  Much of the changing landscape in 
this field will depend on the FCC’s interpretations and the extent of 
 92 Berk W. Washburn, Facsimile Advertising and the Requirement to Get Signed, Written 
Consents, 17 UTAH BAR J. 16, 19 (2004) (concluding that, as long as the public opin-
ion supports the FCC’s balancing of priorities between junk fax senders and junk fax 
recipients, junk fax senders should prepare to get prior express permission to send 
these faxes or risk future liability under the TCPA). 
 93 151 CONG. REC. H5262, 5265 (daily ed. Jun. 28, 2005) (statement of Rep. 
Markey). 
 94 Id. 
 95 Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005: Hearing on S. 714 Before the Subcomm. on Trade, 
Tourism, and Econ. Dev. of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. and Transp., 109th Cong. 
(2005) (statement of David Feeken, on behalf of the National Association of Real-
tors), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/feeken.pdf. 
 96 Id. 
 97 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 227(b)(1)(C)(i)–(ii) (West 2001 & Supp. 2006). 
 98 Id. § 227. 
 99 151 CONG. REC. H5262, 5264 (daily ed. Jun. 28, 2005) (statement of Rep. Up-
ton). 
 100 Id. (statement of Rep. Markey). 
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the limitations that the FCC chooses to impose on the JFPA.  The 
FCC has the discretion to make some integral determinations with re-
spect to the EBR and opt-out provisions in the JFPA.101
First, the Commission is authorized to make some of the provi-
sions, such as the right to limit the “duration” of an existing EBR, 
more stringent to protect junk fax recipients.102  However, before the 
FCC can establish any limits on the duration of the EBR, a few rele-
vant factors must be evaluated.103  Initially, the Commission must de-
termine whether there have been a significant number of complaints 
over the existing EBR.104  Next, the FCC must determine whether a 
significant number of these complaints deals with junk faxes that 
have been sent as a result of an EBR that the Commission believes is 
longer in duration than a consumer’s reasonable expectations.105  Fi-
nally, after weighing both the senders’ costs in demonstrating that an 
EBR exists within a certain period of time and the recipients’ benefits 
in establishing a limitation on these EBRs,106 the FCC must evaluate 
whether the costs would impose an undue burden on small busi-
nesses.107
Second, the FCC has the flexibility to adjust various critical re-
quirements regarding the JFPA’s opt-out provision,108 including the 
ability to determine the amount of time a junk fax sender has to 
comply with a recipient’s opt-out request.109  In addition, the FCC has 
discretionary authority to exempt certain types of small-business 
senders from adhering to the opt-out rule if the costs are unduly bur-
densome.110  The FCC may also waive the notice of an opt-out-
opportunity requirement for tax-exempt nonprofit organizations that 
are furthering their association’s tax-exempt purpose through unso-
licited advertisements.111
 101 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(b)(2)(G)(i) (setting forth the FCC’s ability to limit 
the duration of an EBR’s existence); id. § 227(b)(2)(D) (establishing the FCC’s dis-
cretionary authority relating to certain aspects of the JFPA’s opt-out provision). 
 102 See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 103 See 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 227(b)(2)(G)(i)(I)–(IV). 
 104 Id. § 227(b)(2)(G)(i)(I). 
 105 Id. § 227(b)(2)(G)(i)(II). 
 106 Id. § 227(b)(2)(G)(i)(III). 
 107 Id. § 227(b)(2)(G)(i)(IV). 
 108 Id. § 227(b)(2)(D). 
 109 See supra text accompanying note 78. 
 110 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(b)(2)(D)(iv)(II). 
 111 Id. § 227(b)(2)(F). 
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B. Practical Considerations and Effects of the JFPA 
Although several essential determinations in the JFPA have yet to 
be made, the new Act severely frustrates the primary purpose of the 
TCPA, which sought to protect recipients’ privacy and property rights 
by requiring their “prior express invitation or permission.”112  A story 
in the San Francisco Chronicle113 summarized the effects of the JFPA, 
stating that it “[s]eems like a pretty fundamental right to both privacy 
and personal property that just got taken away so that businesses will 
be able to save a few bucks on advertising.”114  Although it remains to 
be seen how the JFPA will affect the overall landscape of junk faxing 
in general, much will depend on the interpretation and effectiveness 
of the new EBR115 and opt-out116 provisions. 
As a practical matter, the implications and effects of the new 
provisions could adversely affect junk fax recipients more than Con-
gress intended under the JFPA.  First, the JFPA creates a rather broad 
definition of an EBR in order to facilitate a marketer’s interests,117 
enabling a junk fax sender to easily create a legal relationship with a 
recipient.118  In effect, this provision re-establishes junk-fax advertis-
ing as a viable marketing tool, which is what the TCPA had originally 
sought to ban.119  Furthermore, any EBR exemption “heightens fi-
nancial, safety, and privacy concerns when extended to mobile de-
vices or other communication tools for which consumers bear a bur-
den of cost for each advertisement or sales call received.”120  In the 
context of the JFPA, not only does the EBR provision essentially legal-
ize a broad array of business relationships, but the statute fails to 
adequately protect those individuals who are forced to constantly re-
ceive unsolicited faxes.121  Thus, the primary purpose of the JFPA, 
 112 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 113 Steve Kirsch, Letter to the Editor, Your Right to Not Receive Junk Faxes, S.F. 
CHRON., Jul. 17, 2005, at E2. 
 114 Id. 
 115 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 227(b)(1)(C)(i)–(ii). 
 116 Id. § 227(b)(2)(D). 
 117 See supra notes 93–99 and accompanying text. 
 118 See supra notes 70–71, 73 and accompanying text (discussing the breadth of the 
EBR provision in the JFPA). 
 119 See Hearing, supra note 84 (testimony of  Jon. E. Bladine, Region 9 Director, 
National Newspaper Association), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/ 
pdf/bladine.pdf. 
 120 Shannon D. Torgerson, Note, Getting Down to Business: How the Established Busi-
ness Relationship Exemption to the National Do-Not-Call Registry Forces Consumers to Pay for 
Unwanted Sales Calls, 23 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 24, 32 (2004). 
 121 See infra note 127 and accompanying text.  Faxes are different than other tele-
marketing activities in that they are more costly to the recipient.  Such a broad EBR 
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which was to balance the competing concerns of the junk fax senders 
with those of the junk fax recipients,122 is jeopardized. 
In addition, the relative ease with which a junk fax sender ob-
tains a legal relationship with a recipient under the JFPA—and the 
breadth of such a relationship—could significantly impact the stat-
ute’s interpretation in future litigation.123  Although the FCC has the 
ability to limit the duration of an EBR,124 the Commission’s power in 
this area is substantially diminished if a junk fax sender is constantly 
able to re-establish a valid legal relationship simply by obtaining a re-
cipient’s fax number from a website, directory, or advertisement.125  
Therefore, these new provisions threaten to dismantle the bright-line 
distinctions that Congress had created in the original TCPA with re-
spect to which senders’ junk faxes were legally allowable. 
Furthermore, it is unfair to place the burden of opting out on 
the recipient of the junk fax126 while giving the junk-fax sender a cer-
tain amount of time to comply with any opt-out requests.127  Not only 
are recipients forced to pay for the original fax(es) before the oppor-
tunity to opt-out is made available, but they may continue to see their 
privacy and property interests invaded for a period of time even after 
they have made an opt-out request.  In the interim, many faxes can 
be sent, and much damage can be done. 
The practical effects of the opt-out provision in the JFPA pose 
additional concerns.  For instance, the JFPA provides that the junk 
fax recipient receive a cost-free method of opting-out of any un-
wanted faxes.128  However, this provision is merely an illusion, since 
the recipient will always be forced to incur the cost of the time that it 
takes to opt-out.129  In addition, the opt-out provision may not be use-
provision, without a complementary system to adequately protect the interests of 
junk fax recipients, fails to take these increased costs to the recipient into account. 
 122 151 CONG. REC. S3280, 3280 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 2005) (statement of Sen. Smith). 
 123 Michael P. Broadhurst, New Law Allows Business to Communicate With Customers by 
Fax, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 9, 2005, at 7. 
 124 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(b)(2)(G) (West 2001 & Supp. 2006). 
 125 See id. § 227(b)(1)(C)(ii)(II).  Although this exception is not actually called an 
EBR relationship, it acts like one in that it creates another loophole around the 
“prior express permission” requirement, enabling a marketer to continue sending 
junk faxes. 
 126 Id. § 227(b)(2)(D)(ii). 
 127 Id.  The FCC is free to determine the amount of time that a junk fax sender 
has to comply with any opt-out requests.  Id. 
 128 Id. § 227(b)(2)(D)(iv)(II). 
 129 Congress considered the importance of an individual’s time in the CAN-SPAM 
Act.  15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(3) (Supp. IV 2004).  Congress wanted to prevent an indi-
vidual from incurring costs in the form of time needlessly spent trying to access, re-
view, and discard spam.  Id.  Similarly, under the JFPA, junk fax recipients are forced 
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ful to the average recipient.  Many individuals feel as though the opt-
out provisions with regard to spam e-mails do not work because any 
attempted opt-out request would either not be heeded by the sender 
or would open the receiver up to more spam by confirming the valid-
ity of his or her e-mail address.130  Depending on the length of time 
that it takes for the recipients to complete their opt-out requests and 
the level of enforcement of any unfulfilled requests, recipients may 
be unlikely to utilize this opt-out protection. 
V. ANALYSIS OF THE INTRUSIVENESS OF THE EBR AND  
OPT-OUT PROVISIONS 
Many individuals are not even interested in receiving junk faxes 
from those who have established a legitimate business relationship 
with them.131  The underlying issue regarding the JFPA is whether the 
EBR132 and opt-out133 provisions are sufficient to continue protecting 
the privacy and property concerns of these junk fax recipients, which 
is the issue that Congress intended to address with the original 
TCPA.134  Under the JFPA, however, recipients must take the time to 
opt-out of every broad EBR that they may have inadvertently created 
with a junk fax sender or risk having their phone lines tied up, at any 
given point, with an infinite amount of junk faxes.  By enabling this 
type of outcome, the JFPA fails to effectuate the TCPA’s intent and 
inadequately shields a recipient from the intrusiveness caused by junk 
fax advertising.135
The primary purpose of the TCPA was to “protect the privacy in-
terests” of individuals by restricting the fax machine to certain uses.136  
Part of the reason for the TCPA’s complete ban on unsolicited faxes 
without “prior express invitation or permission” was due to junk fax 
recipients’ privacy concerns.137  In order to determine whether the 
new provisions of the JFPA impinge on these privacy interests, they 
to spend time reviewing junk faxes, and subsequently opting out of any unwanted 
EBRs.  Cf. Hernandez v. Kalinowski, 146 F.3d 196, 200 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting Benja-
min Franklin’s famous phrase “time is money”). 
 130 Richard C. Balough, The Do-Not-Call Registry Model is Not the Answer to Spam, 22 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 79, 86–87 (2003). 
 131 Kirsh, supra note 113, at E2. 
 132 JFPA, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 227(b)(1)(C)(i)–(ii) (West 2001 & Supp. 2006). 
 133 Id. § 227(b)(2)(D). 
 134 See supra notes 5, 23, 31–36 and accompanying text. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Int’l Sci. & Tech. Inst. v. Inacom Commc’ns, 106 F.3d 1146, 1150 (4th Cir. 
1997) (citing S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1 (1991), as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 
1968). 
 137 See supra notes 23, 31 and accompanying text. 
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must be analyzed alongside similar privacy regulations and within the 
context of Congress’ original intentions under the TCPA. 
In Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. American Blast Fax, Inc.,138 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted that Congress, 
when adopting the TCPA,  intentionally treated junk faxes and auto-
mated calls differently than live telemarketer calls, which are allowed 
unless an individual objects in advance.139  The court further noted 
that Congress distinguished between these methods because it found 
that live telemarketing solicitations were less invasive with respect to 
an individual’s privacy and less of a nuisance than artificial or prere-
corded telephone calls.140  The court examined Congress’ reasoning, 
stating that “[a]rtificial or prerecorded messages, like a faxed adver-
tisement, were believed to have heightened intrusiveness because 
they are unable to ‘interact with the customer except in prepro-
grammed ways.’”141
Recently, nuisance and privacy concerns associated with elec-
tronic mail (e-mail) have become major issues as well.  Although e-
mail has quickly become an important and reliable form of commu-
nication, its convenience and efficiency have been severely threat-
ened by the growing volume of unsolicited e-mail, commonly re-
ferred to as “spam.”142  A significant amount of an individual’s time 
and money can be needlessly spent reviewing and storing this un-
wanted spam.143  As a result, Congress passed the Controlling the As-
sault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing (CAN-SPAM) 
Act144 of 2003, which went into effect on January 1, 2004, in order to 
impose limitations on spam.145  The primary purpose of the CAN-
SPAM Act is to: 
(i) prohibit senders of [e-mail] for primarily commercial adver-
tisement or promotional purposes from deceiving intended re-
cipients or Internet service providers as to the source or subject 
matter of their e-mail messages; (ii) require such e-mail senders to 
give recipients an opportunity to decline to receive future com-
 138 323 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 139 Id. at 657 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) (2000 & Supp. III 2003); 47 C.F.R. § 
64.1200(e)(2)(iii) (2002)). 
 140 Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 4 & n.4, 5 & n.5 (1991), as reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 1972–73). 
 141 Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 4–5 (1991), as reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1972). 
 142 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a) (Supp. IV 2004). 
 143 Id. § 7701(a)(3). 
 144 Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701–13 (Supp. 
IV. 2004)). 
 145 Id. 
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mercial e-mail from them and to honor such requests; (iii) re-
quire senders of unsolicited commercial e-mail (UCE) to also in-
clude a valid physical address in the e-mail message and a clear 
notice that the message is an advertisement or solicitation; and 
(iv) prohibit businesses from knowingly promoting, or permitting 
the promotion of, their trade or business through e-mail transmit-
ted with false or misleading sender or routing information.146
In addition, the CAN-SPAM Act also permits the Federal Trade 
Commission to establish and implement a nationwide “Do-Not-E-
Mail” registry in the future.147
The originally proposed CAN-SPAM Act allowed commercial e-
mail solicitations as long as an individual gave his express permission 
or implied consent.148  The original “implied consent” provision was 
strikingly similar to both the EBR and opt-out provisions in the 
JFPA.149  For the proposed “implied consent” provision to have ap-
plied, there must have been a business transaction between the indi-
vidual and the solicitor within three years of the e-mail message along 
with notice of an opportunity not to receive the commercial e-mails, 
either at the time of the transaction or upon receipt of the first e-
mail, which the recipient did not exercise.150  In addition, visitation to 
a website, in which the recipient knowingly submitted his e-mail ad-
dress, could be considered a business transaction under the proposed 
provision.151  However, the implied consent exception was removed 
before the bill was passed, leaving only the “express permission” lan-
guage as an acceptable means for permitting e-mail solicitations.152  
Congress decided to remove the “implied consent” exception upon 
its realization that the creation of “such a wide loophole would ren-
der the [A]ct ineffective.”153
 146 S. REP. NO. 108-102, at 1 (2003), as reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2348, 2348. 
 147 15 U.S.C. § 7708. 
 148 Michael P. Considine, Comment, User Registration Websites: Possible E-Loopholes to 
the National Do-Not-Call Registry, 53 EMORY L.J. 1951, 1968 (2004) (citing 149 CONG. 
REC. S13176, 13177 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 2003); 149 CONG. REC. S13012 (daily ed. Oct. 
22, 2003)). 
 149 See id. (discussing how the “implied consent” language was similar to the estab-
lished business relationship exception). 
 150 149 CONG. REC. S13176, 13177 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 2003); see also Considine, su-
pra note 148, at 1968 (discussing the originally proposed provisions of the CAN-
SPAM Act). 
 151 149 CONG. REC. S13176, 13177 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 2003); see also Considine, su-
pra note 148, at 1968. 
 152 Considine, supra note 148, at 1968 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 7701 (Supp. 2004)). 
 153 Id. 
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Congress also discussed the possibility that an EBR exception 
might undermine the effectiveness of the national do-not-call regis-
try: 
Congress understood that the established business relationship 
exception would possibly prove to be a detriment to the national 
do-not-call registry. In discussing the established business rela-
tionship exception, Senator Dodd noted that “[t]here are going 
to be people coming back, once they discover that any prior busi-
ness relationship pretty much will allow the exception to occur . . . 
[that] are going to be asking us to come back and even close the 
loophole down further.”154
The inclusion of an EBR exception has repeatedly invoked wide-
spread concern within Congress as to the provision’s potential to 
render an entire regulation ineffective.  This potential seems to have 
been the driving force behind the ultimate exclusion of the EBR ex-
ception in the CAN-SPAM Act.155
Unlike bulk e-mail and junk faxing, however, which can be col-
lected at the recipient’s leisure, telemarketing may be slightly more 
intrusive on an individual’s privacy rights because the “ring of the 
telephone demands immediate attention.”156  This additional privacy 
concern may help account for the lack of an EBR with respect to un-
solicited machine-based telemarketing.157  But even though the pri-
vacy concerns associated with junk faxing may not, by themselves, be 
as strong as that of receiving an unwanted artificial or prerecorded 
telemarketing call, the total intrusiveness of the marketing effort 
must be taken into account when attempting to regulate.158
In addition to the privacy concerns that junk faxes impose upon 
an individual, much of the intrusiveness of the JFPA centers on the 
fact that the broad EBR provision enables potential senders to take 
recipients’ property without their express consent.159  When deter-
mining the total intrusiveness of a particular marketing method, the 
unwanted invasion on another’s property interests has demanded 
 154 Id. at 1969 (citing 149 CONG. REC. S11957, 11964 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2003) 
(statement of Sen. Dodd)) (alteration in original). 
 155 Although the exclusion of an EBR had been discussed in connection with the 
national do-not-call registry, the provision was ultimately included.  Telemarketing 
Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4580, 4634 (Jan. 29, 2003). 
 156 State v. Casino Mktg. Group, 491 N.W.2d 882, 888 (Minn. 1992). 
 157 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(b)(1)(B) (West 2001 & Supp. 2006). 
 158 See Considine, supra note 148, at 1968 (discussing how the existence of an EBR 
exception strongly depends on the intrusiveness of the marketing effort that Con-
gress is attempting to curtail).  “[T]he more intrusive the marketing effort, the less 
likely an [EBR] will be found.”  Id. 
 159 See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text. 
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considerable attention.  For instance, courts have recognized the af-
fect that spam has on the property rights of Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs),160 who are forced to bear the costs of these unwanted e-
mails.161  High volumes of unsolicited spam impair the value of an 
ISPs server capacity, ultimately diminishing the resources available to 
the ISP subscribers.162
Much like spam, junk faxes have similar effects on property 
rights, except that the individual user is the one who must endure the 
marketers’ advertising costs.163  In Resource Bankshares Corp. v. St. Paul 
Mercury Ins. Co.,164 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit noted the property concerns associated with the receipt of a 
junk fax: 
It is obvious to anyone familiar with a modern office that receipt 
is a “natural or probable consequence” of sending a fax, and re-
ceipt alone occasions the very property damage the TCPA was 
written to address: depletion of the recipient’s time, toner, and 
paper, and occupation of the fax machine and phone line.165
This is one of the major reasons why the FCC attempted to respond 
to junk faxes by requiring “express permission”166 and by eliminating 
any EBR exception that may have applied.167  In Missouri ex rel. Nixon 
v. American Blast Fax, Inc.,168 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit discussed how the TCPA’s provisions advanced the 
governmental interest and ultimate goal of protecting the public 
 160 According to PCMag.com, an Internet Service Provider is defined as “[a]n or-
ganization that provides access to the Internet . . . .  Large ISPs, such as America 
Online (AOL) and Microsoft Network (MSN), also provide proprietary databases, 
forums and services in addition to Internet access.”  PCMag.com Encyclopedia of IT 
Terms, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0%2C2542%2Ct%3DISP&i%3 
D45481%2C00.asp (last visited Feb. 18, 2007). 
 161 The personal property of an ISP is infringed upon when unwanted spam is 
processed and stored on their servers.  CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 
962 F. Supp. 1015, 1017–18 (S.D. Ohio 1997); see also Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, 
Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 452 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that the personal property of 
an ISP was invaded when the defendant used its computer network to transmit unso-
licited bulk e-mails). 
 162 CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1022–23.  This also indirectly hurts the individual 
user who loses the efficiencies created by an e-mail service.  Id. at 1023. 
 163 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 164 407 F.3d 631 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 165 Id. at 639. 
 166 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 167 Res. Bankshares, 407 F.3d at 639.  The FCC response, requiring only “express 
permission” facilitated the enactment of the JFPA.  See supra notes 89–91 and accom-
panying text. 
 168 323 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2003). 
LAUDINO FINAL 4/12/2007  5:09:08 PM 
856 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:835 
 
from unwanted advertising costs.169  The circuit court stated: “Because 
of the cost shifting of fax advertising, it was consistent for Congress to 
treat unsolicited fax advertisements differently than live telemarket-
ing calls.”170  Although the TCPA bans telemarketers from making 
phone calls to wireless numbers using an “artificial or prerecorded 
voice,”171 the FCC has allowed “live” unsolicited telemarketers to call 
wireless cell phones, despite any charges to the recipient for receiving 
the call.172  The total intrusiveness of a “live” telemarketer versus that 
of an “artificial or prerecorded voice” played an integral role in the 
FCC’s determination as to how each of these marketing methods 
should operate. 
Since the EBR exception creates such a wide loophole, its appli-
cation should be limited to fairly unintrusive marketing efforts in or-
der to perpetuate a regulation’s intended effect.  Upon regulating e-
mail solicitations in the CAN-SPAM Act,173 Congress determined that 
an EBR exemption would hinder the effectiveness of the statute’s 
 169 Id. at 657. 
 170 Id. 
 171 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2000 & Supp. III 2003). 
 172 In re Rules and Regulations Implementing Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 68 
Fed. Reg. 44,144, 44,165 (July 25, 2003) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 64, 68).  
Even though the recipient may be charged for a solicitation call to a wireless number 
and the same economic and safety concerns are applicable to both live and artificial 
or prerecorded solicitations, “the Commission has determined not to prohibit all live 
telephone solicitations to wireless numbers.”  Id.  However, artificial or prerecorded 
messages to wireless numbers are banned.  Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)).  
Congress has determined that these artificial or prerecorded messages are costly, in-
convenient and “a greater nuisance and invasion of privacy than live solicitation 
calls.”  Id.  The FCC does point out that the TCPA prohibits any “live solicitation calls 
to wireless numbers using an autodialer.”  Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)).  Fur-
thermore, the national do-not-call database allows for an individual to register his or 
her wireless telephone number to enable the potential recipient to avoid receiving 
any “live” telemarketing phone calls to these wireless phones.  Id. at 44,165–66.  
Thus, the FCC determined that these individuals with wireless numbers are equipped 
with the relatively simple means to prevent the majority of “live” telemarketers from 
calling.  Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection 
Act of 1991, 68 Fed. Reg. at 44,166.  However, simply registering on the do-not-call 
database does not prevent any calls from those with whom the wireless subscriber has 
an EBR.  Id.  The wireless subscriber can still make a “company-specific do-not-call 
request” if he wishes to terminate this EBR.  Id.  By controlling, through the use of 
the do-not-call database, “live” telephone solicitations where there is an EBR, the 
FCC determined that a prohibition on these calls to a wireless number would “un-
duly restrict telemarketers’ ability to contact those consumers who do not object to 
receiving telemarketing calls and use their wireless phones as either their primary or 
only phone.”  Id. 
 173 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701–13 (Supp IV 2004). 
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provisions.174  Although unsolicited e-mail messages can be easily dis-
carded by the recipient, they are extremely easy and cost-efficient for 
a marketer to send.175  This creates a potentially intrusive form of ad-
vertising since the receiver may be forced to incur storage costs and 
time spent “accessing, reviewing, and discarding” the spam.176  The 
JFPA deals with a similar sender-friendly form of marketing,177 which 
can result in the majority of a marketer’s advertising costs being 
pushed onto the recipient.178  This cost-shifting, coupled with the in-
vasion of a junk fax on a recipient’s privacy rights, is comparable to 
the intrusiveness imposed upon an individual receiving spam.179  For 
this reason, the broad EBR provision in the JFPA fails to adequately 
accommodate a junk fax recipient’s interests, and is an inappropriate 
solution to the overall balance sought by the TCPA.180
Although the JFPA’s opt-out clause181 may help to mitigate some 
of the intrusiveness of junk fax advertising, this provision does not 
adequately compensate a recipient for the extraordinary burden im-
posed by the Act’s EBR provision.182  The opt-out clause may not ef-
fectively control junk faxing since a “significant amount of harm can 
be done very rapidly” before the recipient can actually opt-out.183  In 
addition, many recipients are unaware of their rights under the opt-
out system, and even though they do not wish to receive the mes-
sages, they will incur significant costs.184  Furthermore, the opt-out sys-
tem in the JFPA is similar to the opt-out provision that was discussed 
in connection with the unsolicited e-mail regulations in the CAN-
SPAM Act.185  Despite the presence of this opt-out provision, Congress 
still apparently found that the provisions in that statute would be in-
effective due to the EBR’s wide loophole.186
 174 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.  It was not called an EBR in the 
CAN-SPAM Act.  Rather, it was referred to as the “implied consent” provision, al-
though it had the same basic effect as the EBR provision in the JFPA.  See supra note 
150 and accompanying text. 
 175 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(1). 
 176 Id. § 7701(a)(3) (discussing the costs of spam to recipients). 
 177 See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
 178 See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text. 
 179 See supra notes 32–39 and accompanying text. 
 180 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 181 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(b)(2)(D) (West 2001 & Supp. 2006). 
 182 Id. §§ 227(b)(1)(C)(i)–(ii). 
 183 Fisher, supra note 38, at 381. 
 184 Id.  Therefore, “a complete ban is likely to be the only reasonable solution 
when the cost to the consumer massively exceeds the cost to the solicitor.”  Id. 
 185 See supra notes 148–153 and accompanying text. 
 186 See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
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VI.     RECOMMENDATIONS TO BETTER BALANCE THE INTENTIONS OF 
BOTH THE JFPA AND THE TCPA 
Since the regulations imposed in the original TCPA seemed to 
weigh heavily in favor of protecting the junk fax recipient at the ex-
pense of the sender,187 Congress determined that the JFPA was neces-
sary in order to secure an appropriate balance between each side’s 
competing interests and concerns.188  The JFPA’s provisions, however, 
have tipped the scales decidedly in favor of the junk fax sender.  Al-
though those who wish to advertise through fax machines should be 
afforded First Amendment commercial speech protection,189 a slightly 
different approach concerning the EBR190 and opt-out191 provisions 
could provide this protection and enhance the practical effects of the 
JFPA at the same time.  Due to the intrusiveness of junk faxes,192 the 
current interplay between the EBR and opt-out provisions seems to 
render any junk fax regulations ineffective.  The following are a few 
of the possible solutions that will achieve a more even balance among 
these competing concerns. 
A. Creation of an EBR 
Instead of imposing the burden to “opt-out” of junk faxes on the 
recipients, Congress should appropriately shift the burden to the 
senders through the use of an “opt-in” provision.  Although the FCC’s 
revised interpretation of the original TCPA193 may have stymied the 
marketing attempts of junk fax senders,194 the “prior express permis-
sion” requirement before each and every fax195 would have afforded a 
significant amount of protection for junk fax recipients.196  By permit-
ting the creation of an EBR merely through public knowledge of a 
recipient’s fax number,197 however, the JFPA eliminates this protec-
 187 See 151 CONG. REC. H5262, 5264–65 (daily ed. Jun. 28, 2005) (statement of 
Rep. Markey). 
 188 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 189 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 190 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 227(b)(1)(C)(i)–(ii) (West 2001 & Supp. 2006). 
 191 Id. § 227(b)(2)(D). 
 192 See supra notes 31–33, 35–37, 44 and accompanying text. 
 193 See supra notes 87–92 and accompanying text. 
 194 See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text. 
 195 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 196 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 197 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 227(b)(1)(C)(ii)(I)–(II) (West 2001 & Supp. 2006).  A mar-
keter can send junk faxes to a recipient if the recipient voluntarily communicates his 
number in the context of an EBR, or if the sender finds the number in “a directory, 
advertisement, or site on the Internet to which the recipient voluntarily agreed to 
make available its [fax] number for public distribution.”  Id. 
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tion and enables an EBR to be created much too easily.  Thus, in or-
der to further balance the competing interests of both the junk fax 
receivers and the senders, a receiver should be required to sign a one-
time, signed, and written consent in order to originally “opt-in” for 
these junk faxes.  The sender can then use this written consent to es-
tablish an EBR with the receiver; thus narrowing down the ability to 
create an EBR in the first place. 
There are two possible ways to adopt this “opt-in” system, both of 
which grant significantly more protection to the junk fax receiver 
than the current EBR provision while still considering the interests of 
the junk fax sender.  First, a strict “opt-in” provision could be used 
where the one and only way to create an EBR, and thus allow senders 
to transmit junk faxes to a particular recipient, is to require the re-
cipient to “opt-in.”  For example, a sender would only be able to 
transmit junk faxes to those receivers who have signed a one-time, 
prior written consent agreement.  Once the one-time “opt-in” is 
signed by the recipient, an EBR is created and the sender can freely 
transmit junk faxes to that recipient without his or her “prior written 
consent.” 
Second, if Congress feels that the current EBR provision should 
be narrowed without completely eliminating it, a modified “opt-in” 
approach should be taken.  Under this approach, the current EBR 
under the JFPA is still completely eliminated unless a recipient de-
cides to either opt-in under the one-time “opt-in” consent provision or 
the recipient falls within a few special categories of relationships 
which could automatically establish an EBR, even without the recipi-
ent purposely deciding to “opt-in.”  Under this modified approach, 
Congress could define certain “special” relationships that would 
automatically qualify as EBRs.  For example, Congress may determine 
that one of these “special” categories is the relationship between a 
customer and a business from which a product or a service has been 
purchased by the consumer within a specific time period, such as the 
previous three months.  However, in order to decrease the wide 
loopholes that are apparent in the JFPA’s current EBR relationship,198 
these “special” categories should be fairly limited in scope and de-
fined much more narrowly.  This way, it would still be significantly 
harder for a particular relationship to qualify as an EBR under the 
“modified opt-in” approach than under the current broad EBR quali-
fications in the JFPA.199  Under this “modified opt-in” approach, any 
 198 Id. §§ 227(b)(1)(C)(i)–(ii). 
 199 Id. 
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relationship that does not fall within one of these “special” categories 
is not an EBR, and the receiver must then provide the sender with 
the one-time “opt-in” consent in order to create a valid EBR. 
Importantly, this additional opt-in feature would not replace or 
eliminate the current opt-out provision in the JFPA.  Rather, the opt-
out clause in the JFPA could be modified to apply to those who have 
given their express written permission or implied permission through 
a “special” relationship but later decide to terminate the EBR and 
discontinue junk fax receipt.  Once an EBR is created, the burden 
would then appropriately fall on the receiver to “opt-out” of the EBR 
relationship.200
Both of these systems should withstand any challenges that they 
unlawfully restrict commercial speech,201 since the TCPA frequently 
withstood such First Amendment challenges,202 and these provisions 
are more narrowly tailored to serve Congress’ interest203 in preventing 
cost-shifting in fax advertising.204  In addition, with either system in 
place, the interests and goals of the junk fax sender and the junk fax 
receiver would be taken into account.  Junk fax senders, such as those 
in the real estate industry, would be able to realize cost-efficiencies 
because they would not have to be burdened with constantly obtain-
ing a consumers’ prior written consent before sending each and every 
fax.205  Furthermore, the broad loophole that the EBR exception cre-
ated is eliminated.  A junk fax receiver who does not wish to receive 
these faxes could adequately protect his or her privacy and property 
interests from those senders who may be able to establish some type 
of attenuated EBR under the current system. 
B. The FCC’s Power 
A second possible improvement to the JFPA deals with the FCC’s 
ability to influence the development of an EBR.206  Although the FCC 
may currently limit the duration of a viable EBR’s existence,207  Con-
gress should grant the FCC sole discretion to enhance or restrict the 
ability of a marketer to create a viable EBR with a junk fax recipient in 
 200 This opt-out provision could work much like the “opt-out” provision in the 
JFPA.  Id. § 227(b)(2)(D). 
 201 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 202 See supra notes 55–64 and accompanying text. 
 203 See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text. 
 204 See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
 205 See supra notes 95–99 and accompanying text. 
 206 See supra notes 102–107 and accompanying text. 
 207 See supra notes 72, 102, 107 and accompanying text. 
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the first place.208  While this type of FCC power is not necessary under 
a “strict opt-in” system, such as the one discussed above,209 under the 
“modified opt-in” approach, this power would enable the FCC to es-
tablish or remove any “special” automatic EBRs that prove helpful or 
ineffective when compared to the overall intentions of the Act.210  
Even under the current EBR approach taken in the JFPA,211 granting 
the FCC the ability to narrow the creation of an EBR would permit it 
to significantly enhance the practical effects of the Act. 
Much like the current provisions in the JFPA, in either of the 
two new approaches that this Comment proposes,212 the FCC can still 
continue imposing any necessary limits on the duration of an EBR213 
created through either “prior express written consent” or through a 
“special” automatic EBR.  For example, the FCC may determine that 
the recipient’s one-time “opt-in” to receive junk faxes is not sufficient 
to create an indefinite EBR.  Rather, the FCC may require the recipi-
ent to renew his or her “opt-in” consent every 12 months in order to 
re-establish a valid legal relationship with the junk fax sender for the 
following year.  Thus, the FCC could continually monitor the various 
legal relationships and increase or decrease their duration depending 
on the practical effects of the legal relationship on the interests of all 
the parties involved. 
 208 In defining an EBR, the JFPA refers to 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations that went into effect as of January 1, 2003.  See supra note 71 and accom-
panying text.  Furthermore, the JFPA specifically permits certain other EBRs, aside 
from the one that can be created pursuant to the definition provided by the Code of 
Federal Regulations.  See supra note 73 and accompanying text.  The JFPA’s provisions, 
however, do not grant the FCC the ability to continuously monitor and change what 
constitutes a viable EBR. 
 209 See supra Part VI.A. 
 210 Granting the FCC the ability to limit or enhance the potential creation of an 
EBR in the first place may not matter if the “opt-in” limitation was adopted because, 
under the “opt-in” scenario, the sole means for creating an EBR is through the one-
time prior written consent of the recipient.  Under the “modified opt-in” scenario, 
however, Congress may define certain “special” relationships as automatic EBRs, 
even without the prior express written permission of the recipient.  Under this sce-
nario, the FCC could eliminate any automatic “special” EBRs that are too burden-
some on the junk fax recipient.  Likewise, the FCC could create new automatic “spe-
cial” EBRs if the junk fax sender is being unduly burdened. 
 211 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 227(b)(1)(C)(i)–(ii) (West 2001 & Supp. 2006). 
 212 This refers to both the “strict opt-in” approach and the “modified opt-in” ap-
proach. 
 213 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(b)(2)(G). 
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VII.     CONCLUSION 
One of the primary reasons for the JFPA was to alleviate the on-
erous burden that the FCC sought to impose on junk fax senders.214  
In addition, the JFPA set out to fulfill one of the main intentions of 
the TCPA,215 which was to accommodate, align, and balance the com-
peting interests of the junk fax sender with the interests of the junk 
fax recipient.216  However, the JFPA has tipped the scales in favor of 
the junk fax sender, forcing the recipients to bear a fairly intrusive 
burden on their privacy and property interests, even though they may 
not wish to receive the sender’s message.  Not only are recipients in-
truded upon in the form of an initial fax before receiving an opt-out 
opportunity, but they are then forced to bear the burden of opting-
out of each broadly created EBR217 in order to prevent any future so-
licitations.218  Contrary to other forms of marketing, the approach 
taken by the JFPA forces unwilling recipients to bear the marketers’ 
initial advertising costs.  While someone must incur these initial costs, 
this onerous burden should not fall on the innocent recipient.  
Rather, this cost, much like other marketing costs, can only fairly be 
pushed onto the senders who are seeking to market or promote their 
products or services through unsolicited advertisements.219  There-
fore, the adoption of a junk fax method, such as the “strict” or “modi-
fied” opt-in approach,220 would properly align these initial burdens 
while appropriately balancing each party’s overall interests and con-
cerns. 
 214 See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text. 
 215 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 216 151 CONG. REC. S3280 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 2005) (statement of Sen. Smith). 
 217 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 227(b)(1)(C)(i)–(ii). 
 218 Id. §§ 227(b)(2)(D)–(E). 
 219 Gary Miller, How to Can Spam: Legislating Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail, 2 VAND. 
J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 127, 131 (2000) (“[N]o one should be required to subsidize some-
one else's advertisements.  After all, speech is only free if you do not force someone 
else to pay for it.”). 
 220 See supra Part VI.A. 
